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Abstract The increasing ‘trans-scalar’ conditions
of urbanity imply unique opportunities and threats for
urban policies. When drawing up strategic urban
policies, cities are confronted with the dominance of
higher level policy programmes and even more so
with the hegemonic power of globalizing markets.
Could urban policies also undergo a similar change
and actively pursue the enlargement of local power
and energies by becoming actively involved in the
higher level scaled networks? By building on useful
concepts of urban regime theory and more recent
rescaling theories, the authors argue that this element
of ‘foreign policy’ should be integrated in the core
analysis of urban policy approaches. The case is
explored and illustrated in two European examples of
strategic urban planning, namely Barcelona and
Copenhagen. The cases provide evidence of the
enlargement of local power via active trans-scalar
policies. For civic groups, however, this strategy still
appears to be a bridge too far in both cases.
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Introduction
The enlargement of scale and scope of urban
activities in the globalising society confronts cities
with new challenges. The establishing of urban
policies is becoming more and more dependent on
external conditions beyond local control. On the other
hand, the emergence of a new infrastructure of trans-
scalar networks might create new opportunities for
local actors to become actively involved in the
processes of rescaling and they even might enlarge
local power and local opportunities by becoming
actively interconnected with the new infrastructure of
‘non-place bounded’ energies. In this paper we
explore the meaning and potential impact of this
trans-scalar dimension. In order to frame the concept
of analysis, we build, in the first section, on the
stepping stones of urban regime theory. Urban regime
theory dominated the American urban policy analyses
throughout the entire 1990s. In the next section, the
urban regime framework is extended with more
recent urban theories that include the rescaling of
urban activities. These theories provide a great deal
of insight into the dynamic macroscopic changes of
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urban conditions. In addition to these concepts, we
explore the ways in which local actors might become
actively involved in the ongoing processes of
rescaling.
In the second part of the paper, empirical evidence
is sought for these emergent opportunities of strategic
urban policy making. Profiting from the trans-scalar
dimension is still an embryonic element of urban
planning strategies. For this reason we selected two
relatively advanced cases of strategic urban planning
in Europe, namely the strategic planning in Barcelona
and Copenhagen. We critically investigate the strong
and weak performances in the two cases. The paper
concludes that the involvement of local actors in
trans-scalar strategies is still highly differentiated in
the current era of urban transition.
Analysing urban policies: the stepping stones
of urban regime theory
After the frequent use of elitist and pluralist
approaches from the 1950s until the early 1980s,
the concept of urban regime theory emerged and, in a
few years time, became a new dominant approach to
analysing urban politics in American political and
policy sciences (Fainstein et al. 1983; Elkin 1985;
Logan and Molotch 1987; Stone 1989). Adherents of
the urban regime theory claimed to give more
systematic attention to and a more theoretical expla-
nation for the organisation of power in urban
development policies than preceding approaches. A
key feature of this approach is the explanation of
enduring forms of coordinated action between urban
government and parts of the private sector. Although
the interests of public agencies and private sector
actors differ in many ways, enduring forms of
cooperation—usually not formalised in statutory or
contractual agreements but overtly visible in actual
policymaking—were identified in many long-term
case studies of American cities. More recently,
overseas investigations have been carried out which,
in particular, compare the politics in British cities
(Digaetano and Klemanski 1999; Hambleton 2003).
According to this approach the power on political
decisions of urban policy is not exclusively held by
political leaders (elitist theory), neither by more or
less instantaneous coalitions between powerful agents
(pluralism). Instead there is a sort of ‘systemic
power’ behind the daily decisions, a regime explain-
ing a systematic selection of political decisions
(Stone 1989).
The in-depth historical search by Elkin into the
conceptual roots of the American Republic convin-
cingly clarified the emergence of this type of regime
and the many variable forms it may take in local
practices (Elkin 1985). Elkin demonstrated that
decisions on local development are not simply
produced by those in local political power but
primarily by those in charge of economic production
and investment. Although political power depends on
the whole set of electoral votes (without voting
privilege for the relatively small group of entrepre-
neurs), urban policymaking is also dependent on the
preparedness of entrepreneurs to produce in a certain
place and on the tax income which is generated in this
way. The emergence of a regime behind political
decisions is dependent on the bridging of these two
arrangements: the balancing of ‘financial accoun-
tability’ and ‘electoral accountability’. This balance
is extremely sensitive and differs greatly between
cities, and even more so between cities in different
countries. In general terms, American city politics is
dependent to a high degree on income generated
locally (local taxes and other own incomes) which
produces a local political culture based on the notion
of cooperation with business interests. In Europe,
local and regional government is in general financed
to a much higher degree by national government,
giving more space to manoeuvre between national
preferences and local electoral motives. In the US
context, open rivalry between municipalities with a
view to acquiring the favour of private investment is
common, while it is still more hidden and indirect in
the context of European cities.
The predisposition of urban politics to private
sector investment generates the regime condition that
may explain (in all sorts of variances) the emergence
of enduring alliances between different interests.
Although established informally, urban regimes sys-
tematically include some interests and exclude others.
Regimes usually consist of elected political leaders
and business as the key participants and may include
some further specific groups. Although the partici-
pants are not equal as regards position, they share
goals and they are able to mobilise institutional
sources in order to enable effective results. It is power
as form of social co-production (Stoker 1995). In a
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theoretical appraisal of urban regime theory, Stoker
refers to the meaning of power conceived as a
network of mutual dependency instead of power as
control by a hierarchical actor, writing, ‘Cooperation
is sustained by solidarity, trust and mutual support
instead of hierarchy and bargaining’ (Stoker 1995).
The existence of an urban regime as an enduring
regime for the long term is not at all evident. Urban
regime theory may explain the systematic character
of power conditions and the conditions for mutual
dependency of differently interested groups, but
efforts are still required to make an informal and
endurable regime effective and selective as regards
its long term strategic goals. It requires what Stoker
calls a ‘pre-emptive power of social production
forms’, based on leadership in coalition in a complex
and fragmented world.
To conclude our review of urban regime theory, it is
here—in the basic notion of interconnectivity as a key
to understand new forms of power and leadership—
that we continue our search into trans-scalar policy
strategies, as the context of political decision-making
has become even more complex and uncertain in the
current era of urban transformation in the last decade.
The building blocks of urban regime theory provide
useful analytical keys in connection with such action
and governance focused concepts as ‘systemic power’,
‘power as social production’ and ‘leadership in coali-
tion’ instead of frames of direct control. In this specific
way, urban regime theory is an example of one of the
frames of interpretation used in more recent theories of
urban governance. As a second crucial notion of urban
regime theory we build on the constructive use of the
action perspective in this theory (in the form of co-
production). According to this constructive notion of
policy analysis, ‘policy matters’.
Although systematically biased in order to appease
economic investors, it is the differentiation of poli-
tical strategies and the differentiation of coalitions
with the private sector in which urban regime theory
is interested. Even in the minimalist context of
market-type American cities, urban regime theory
allows an analysis of different forms of policy
coalitions. Indeed, it makes a difference whether
black communities are included or excluded from
regimes, whether social issues of unemployment or
education are part of the regime or not, and whether
ecological organisations are included or not. Adher-
ents of this approach are searching for the conditions
under which the ‘use value’ of urban spaces might be
promoted instead of the systematic reproduction of
‘exchange values’ (Logan and Molotch 1987) (after
the French sociologist Lefebvre 1991). It is the
awareness of systematic bias to economic interests on
the one hand and the combination with different uses
of the electoral power on the other that keeps this
approach viable and transforming (Fainstein et al.
1983; Mollenkopf 1992).
The rescaling context of urban governance
The urban regime theory has its shortcomings as well.
One of the most frequently uttered objections to
urban regime theory is its low level of abstraction and
the direct focus on local arenas of action (Harding
1995). A local frame of policy analysis cannot stand
the dynamics of urban development in an episode of
rapid urban transformation which is increasingly
characterised by trans-local and global tendencies of
production and consumption. It is in response to this
that some scholars attempted to construct a bridge
between urban regime theory and economic regula-
tion theory (Lauria 1997).
Economic regulation theory implies a macroscopic
view of the accumulation of capital in the global
economic system and its periodical crises. It inves-
tigates the inherent political necessities for
accommodating the economic crises and the transi-
tion to new stages of accumulation (Boyer 1990).
Although it has a tendency to economism, the
macroscopic view is fascinating and may help to
explain contextual changes in the position of local
economic systems (Harvey 2001). Up to now,
however, the regulation theory has developed in
more conceptual frames than in empirical evidence
(Goodwin 2001). The ‘regulation school’ might be
expected to provide useful empirical findings about
the impact of macro level economic conditions on the
position of local economic systems. Ontologically,
however, it is not easy to connect the macro level
regulation type of analysis of systematic economic
power directly with the very differentiated action
perspectives of urban regime theories. Regulation
theory has no antenna for the variable choices of
action perspectives and it considers regulation as
being directly related to the macro level changes in
economic context.
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Kevin Cox made serious efforts to connect the
economic global networks and the local regimes
(1998). More recently, the work on the rescaling of
policy strategies by Neil Brenner has also created
new conceptual bridges and openings. Brenner man-
aged to translate the macroscopic economic dynamics
into researchable hypotheses about actual develop-
ment strategies for urban regions. Brenner
hypothesises on the emergence of new state spaces
via the construction of new coalitions for regional
growth. National economic systems would bring their
most advanced economic regions into a more
privileged and autonomous position in order to meet
the highly competitive standards in the rivalry
between national states (Brenner et al. 2003; Brenner
2004). In this way, regional development policies are
made part of changing national and international
policy coalitions. Thus far, these fascinating concepts
have only partly been investigated in empirical
research. We believe there is a lot of evidence of the
change of national economic policies into regional
development in European nation states. There was the
changing from the national support to economically
peripheral regions in the 1950s through to the 1970s
and to the support of regions with the highest
economic potential during the past two decades.
Following the market-led regionalisation of economic
systems under the competing conditions of liberalised
markets, the national economic policies decided to bet
on the strongest regional horses. It is only at the level
of the European Union that—for political reasons—
there is still a tendency to support peripheral regions.
Less evidence, however, exists on the hypothesis of
decentralisation of economic policies to autonomous
regions. We would expect more differentiation of the
central–regional interrelationships in European
member states.
Increasingly, local and regional development pol-
icies are becoming involved in trans-scalar coalitions
of policymaking (inter-regional, national and inter-
national). Obviously, this process did not start in the
public sector and crossed the borders of local and
regional arenas which have prevailed for many years
in the private sector. However, the phenomenon
reached a new stage of intensity in the private sector
as well as a result of the explosive growth of
telecommunication and the information society.
Crossing borders no longer means keeping relation-
ships with external agencies but economic processes
increasingly have become trans-scalar as such: the
external dimension has been internalised. Since the
groundbreaking studies of Sassen and many others,
the impact of economic rescaling and global net-
works on the functioning of economic systems have
been intensively studied in the literature of recent
decades (Sassen 2001; Swyngedouw 1997). The
interesting question for local and regional develop-
ment strategies is whether there is a growing
one-sided dependency on the non-place bounded
relationships of economic power and on the new state
spaces or whether new forms of local responsiveness
are being invented.
Our aim, therefore, is to explore the conditions of
enlarging the local action space in the context of a
new infrastructure of trans-scalar relationships of
economic power. Savitch and Kantor explored this
action perspective in various local contexts. They
found numerous forms of local responsiveness: cities
need not be ‘leaves in the wind’ (Savitch and Kantor
2002, p. 346). Their investigation focused on the
‘driving’ and ‘steering’ variables that enable cities to
bargain responsive strategies under the conditions of
the international market (Savitch and Kantor 2002, pp
149–170). In this paper, we want to explore the action
perspective of local responsiveness a bit further by
focusing on the enlargement of local action space in
trans-scalar policy strategies. The trans-scalar dimen-
sion is not just a result of changing policies at higher
levels of scale but might also actively be initiated
from the bottom up in the shaping of new trans-scalar
strategies of policymaking. In exploring this bottom-
up dimension, however, we have to distinguish
between different sorts of local participants. The
established local policies are usually very concerned
about their position of economic competitiveness.
Considered from this perspective local politics might
make more effort to become interconnected with
external economic networks. However, civic groups
might adopt a different perspective in the develop-
ment of cities, and might attempt to become
interconnected with counter hegemonic networks.
Evans investigated the counter hegemonic globaliza-
tion of transnational social movements which oppose
the dominance of international economic networks
(Evans 2005). He distinguished three broad families
of transnational movements aimed at counter hege-
monic globalization (countering transnational
economic hegemonies): labour movements, women’s
94 GeoJournal (2008) 72:91–103
123
movements, and environmental movements (Evans
2005, p. 658). We have not yet found significant
counter hegemonic transnational movements at the
level of urban strategies in the current stage of urban
transformation, nor in the two advanced case studies
that are discussed later. However, some expect
similar tendencies to become more significant in the
coming years.
The multi-levelled context of governance differs in
Europe in many respects from the North American
conditions. In all European nation states, the
national—local nexus dominated the building up of
the national welfare states. The profiles of individual
European states differed strongly of course (from
relatively liberal, to the entrepreneurial state, and
from corporatist to etatist) but everywhere local and
regional policy strategies were shielded by national
arrangements from direct dependency on market
conditions. Even in the liberal UK, more than 60%
of municipal expenditure was provided via national
funding. The national governments used to specify
the conditions of local policies. In many countries
this dependency also extended to the provision of
semi-public goods, such as social housing, public
transportation, health services, education, energy, etc.
The local providers of these goods— although often
founded on private law—were as much dependent on
the national arrangements as local governments
themselves. This extremely variegated but largely
‘nationally-dependent’ context of local and regional
policymaking has changed dramatically in the last
two decades (LeGale`s 2002). The most dramatic
change is the continuous tendency of liberalisation,
bringing a greater need for initiatives aimed at the
setting up of privatised organisation.
Regarding public amenities, however, the public
sector usually still decides on the conditions and, in
most cases, there is no evidence of complete priva-
tisation. The second process of change occurred
within the public sector itself. A continuing tendency
of differentiation has drastically changed the post war
profiles of the European nation states. Obviously, the
nation state is not on the decline as some observers
thought (Ohmae 1995). The nation state is still
omnipresent in all sorts of intergovernmental rela-
tionships but the one-sided hegemony of the national-
local axis has disappeared almost everywhere. The
national states decentralised large parts of policy
production to lower tiers of government and to semi-
autonomous public agencies (quangos). In many
cases, the processes of decentralisation are still
conditioned, but local and regional responsibilities
have increased considerably. The emergence of new
meso-government may be regarded as one of the most
structural innovations in the intergovernmental rela-
tionships of unitary European nation states in the last
decades. Before the early 1980s, most unitary states
in Europe did not even have regional tiers of
government. Now they exist in all European countries
under variegated conditions of power (Newman and
Herrschel 2002). The processes of governmental
rescaling are also taking place towards the inter-
national level. In particular, the European Union has
grown into an effective new tier in almost all forms of
policy. European decision-making does not simply
mean regulating at a higher level of government, but
is an extremely complex fabric of trans-scalar
wheeling and dealing (Brenner 1999; Hooghe and
Marks 2001; LeGale`s and Lequesne 1998; Gualini
2006)
This new context of multi-actor and multi-level
governance enables additional policy strategies.
Instead of a prevailing national–local arrangement
for local and regional policy, the context for policy
games enables many sorts of coalition making at
different levels of scales and between different types
of actors. The choices for coalition making are not
completely free of course and there are still hege-
monies of public and private sector based power.
However, the potential for policy differentiation has
increased considerably (LeGale`s 2002). Regional
governments may cooperate with other regions in
order to achieve a greater impact on the decision-
making at European level. They may cooperate with
national governments, and they may even produce
counter coalitions with Europe in order to prevent
one-sided dependencies on national policies (as
frequently observed in federal Germany with its
powerful states). In addition, there may be different
sorts of interconnectivity with economic or social
stake holders in the private sector. In other words, the
policy field for regional policymaking has become
extremely differentiated, resulting in all sorts of
different, overlapping and even conflicting coalitions
of policymaking (Salet and Thornley 2007).
Some urban and regional systems are more active
than others in exploring the new potential of policy-
making in this changed context. In our investigations
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into metropolitan governance in European city-
regions we found dramatic differences, ranging from
regional politicians and planners that still operate in
the mode of post-war dependency of national
arrangements, to regions that launch their own inter
local strategies against the national prerogatives. We
explored this trans-scalar dimension in the framing of
some of the largest urban projects under construction
in seven European city-regions (Salet and Gualini
2007).
Some experiences of trans-scalar strategies
of planning in two European city regions
Barcelona and Copenhagen are two of the most
advanced examples in the European context where, in
the last two decades, active local municipalities have
explored trans-scalar networks to focus and enrich
urban planning strategies. We briefly investigate
these forms of local responsiveness, analyse the
institutional dynamism they have brought about and
identify several conflicts and imbalances in their
outcomes.
A cultural and project oriented approach
in Barcelona
The Barcelona municipality has developed a well-
known strategy in the last two decades of connecting
and aligning an agenda of strategic urban projects
with higher levels of government and the private
sector. Barcelona’s urban development strategies,
especially related to the Olympic Games of 1992,
have been extensively analyzed, praised, copied and
criticised (e.g. McNeill 1999; Monclu´s 2003; Mar-
shall 2004). In the post-Olympic era, the Forum
project most interestingly radicalises the idea of local
responsiveness. Via a ‘self-invented’ international
cultural event, rather than an existing international
showcase, the municipality organised public and
private investments for a major programme of
infrastructure and urban investments.
The series of urban interventions linked to the
Olympic Games of 1992 are often referred to as a
textbook example of a local government that is
successful in organizing processes of public–public
and public–private leverage (Garcia-Ramon and
Albet 2000). The municipality, then led by the
charismatic and determined mayor Pasqual Maragall,
skilfully used the imminent deadline of the Olympics
to push through an extensive package of separate but
highly connected projects for new infrastructures,
squares, parks, housing areas and improved telecom-
munication (McNeill 2001). The essential point from
the perspective of local responsiveness was that the
city’s government understood the opportunity the
Olympics presented for focusing and for prioritising
its policies—an exercise that was made easier due to
the dominant position of the social-democratic party
in the municipal council. In addition, the event
deadline, together with the international attention,
was the key to the setting up of coalitions of support
with the business sector and the regional and national
government—two levels of government that had
previously not been very supportive.
The Forum 2004 and other post-Olympic projects
had their origins in a structural economic weakness of
the Olympic transformation. The major developments
in that era did not specifically target Barcelona’s
underdeveloped higher tertiary economic sectors and
its still emergent regional and national infrastructure
connectivity. In a situation of perceived rising outside
pressures in favour of ‘competitive’ development, it
was therefore no surprise that the series of strategic
plans developed in the Nineties strongly embraced
the vision of integrating urban investments with
economic policies and the ambition of enhancing
Barcelona’s connectivity in economic webs (Santa-
cana 2000). This was a strategic shift away from the
community-based approach of the Eighties that
focused specifically on carefully renovating neigh-
bourhoods and creating new public spaces (Busquets
2005). Even the Olympic programme had a quite
localised impact since its developments were con-
centrated in four zones, while its more visible larger
elements, especially the new beaches, were widely
supported, by civic groups as well. However, Barce-
lona’s post-Olympic round of strategic urban
investments shifted the municipal agenda towards
much bigger and particularly economic oriented
projects: the expansion of trade fair facilities, the
expansion of the airport, the connection towards the
high-speed train network and the development of a
large area of logistic facilities in the Llobregat Delta.
In the old industrial area of Poblenou, a comprehen-
sive long-term redevelopment scheme, 22@, was
introduced whose aim was to transform the area into
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a place for high-tech industries and creative industry.
This transformation was connected to two urban
mega projects, namely the development of the
Sagrera/St. Andreu area, a mixed-use project around
a future high speed train station, and Forum, a project
of infrastructural, environmental and urban invest-
ments at the mouth of the river Beso`s. Due to the
municipality’s substantial debts after the games, it
became clear that this ambitious local development
agenda had to be realised mainly by the private sector
or on the basis of higher-level government invest-
ments (Rowe 2006).
Here, we focus briefly on the Forum project
because of its particular significance and originality
in creating new trans-scalar cultural relations. The
project aims to transform an old industrial area into a
project of important new economic activities and
public spaces. Its location is a brownfield where the
grand Avinguda Diagonal reaches the Mediterranean
Sea. The project aim was a total overhaul of the area
with a mixed-use programme and large public spaces,
integrated with the existing and upgraded waste-
water treatment, incinerator and power plant in the
area. While the large Forum project is a specifically
public-funded project, creating a new area of open
spaces and facilities like a marina, a conference
centre and a new university campus, the adjacent
Diagonal Mar project—which we analyse as an
integral part of the total Forum transformation
project—is a purely private sector investment in
high-end condominiums, in combination with an
indoor shopping mall and some other functions.
Table 1 summarises the programme of urban invest-
ments in Forum.
As far as the municipality of Barcelona was
concerned, the Forum project had several intercon-
nected spatial, economic and environmental goals. It
was seen as an area in which crucial economic
structures could be located to enhance the city’s
economic vitality in advanced economic networks,
particularly a large conference centre and a new
university. It was also an opportunity to transfer the
last brownfield part of the city’s eastern coastline into
a beach and marina, thereby stimulating tourism. By
upgrading the existing environmental facilities in the
area, a new central public area could be realised
which was expected to enhance existing physical,
economic and social revitalisation programmes in
different surrounding disadvantages neighbourhoods
in the area and which could be used as an area for
large-scale public events (Ajuntament de Barcelona
2006). To the municipality, these all represented
desirable but very expensive public investments,
which could only be realised by higher-level govern-
ment investments and private participation. Inspired
by the success of the Olympic Games, a crucial
aspect of the strategy of the local government was to
link the transformation to an ambitious international
cultural event. It was hoped that this would inspire
the business sector and higher levels of government
to invest in Forum. Since it was not possible in the
short-term to attract an existing large event (Olym-
pics, Expo) to the city, the municipality responded by
‘inventing’ a new kind of event itself. Interestingly
enough, the city understood that it was necessary to
connect such an event with trans-scalar (inter-
national) networks to increase its relevance,
(inter)national attention and capacity to persuade
other actors to invest. Eventually, in 1997, UNESCO
support was acquired for the organisation of an event
named ‘2004 Universal Forum of Cultures’. As a sort
of cultural Olympic Games, this four month outdoor
event featuring debates, exhibitions and perfor-
mances was also expected to strengthen Barcelona’s
Table 1 Programme of urban investments in the Forum and Diagonal Mar area 2001–2008
Surface (ha.) Housing (m2) Hotels (m2) Offices (m2) Other com. functions (m2) Total programme (m2)
Forum 222 82,000 86,000 109,645c 35,994 313,639
Diagonal Mar 23.5 169,978 58,000 57,000 87,000 371,978
Total 245.5 251,978a 144,000b 166,645 122,994 685,617
a In the neighbouring areas of La Mina and La Catalana another 2,477 housing units are to be built as part of the revitalization plans
for these areas (not included in these numbers)
b Outside the project area and alongside the coast another 641 hotel beds have already been realized in the last few years
c A large number of the offices in the Forum area are buildings for the University campus in the Llull-Taulat zone. Source:
Ajuntament de Barcelona 2006; Tersol 2004
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position as an important cultural city and a tourist
magnet (Luzo´n and Vila 2007).
With the support of UNESCO, the municipality
persuaded the regional and national government to
form the Forum Consortium, to organise the cultural
event and link its development with the community
and Barcelona’s cultural scene (Garcı´a 2004). A
purely public consortium, the Consorci del Besos,
with political leaders of the two municipalities the
project area was in, was formed to coordinate all
planning activities in the area. The Diagonal Mar area
was assigned completely to one large American
property developer, namely Hines.
As Table 2 shows, the project was particularly
successful in persuading the region and the national
government to allocate European funds they were
allowed to spend anywhere in their jurisdiction to the
Forum project. This is the source of most investments
for the environmental improvements in the area for
example. The municipality of Barcelona also used
money from its European fund for local development
to finance 32.9% of its total of 784.90 million euro
investment during the first few years (Ajuntament de
Barcelona 2006). Various interviews with profes-
sionals involved in the planning of the project
revealed that the political support and quick alloca-
tion of subsidies via the regional and the national
government was possible due to the pressure to
finalise the new infrastructures quickly before the
start of the 2004 Universal Forum of Cultures.
However, apart from the quick physical transfor-
mation that the formula helped to achieve, Forum can
hardly be described as an overall success. The 2004
event attracted only a modest 3 million visitors, despite
7 million being expected. Now, several years on, we
can reflect briefly on the outcomes of the project and
the extent to which this particular example of a trans-
scalar form of local responsiveness was successful.
Although the cultural strategy was potentially
powerful to give ‘meaning’ to the transformation
and to generate input and commitment from Barce-
lona’s lively civic and cultural society, the
programme of the event became privatised to please
corporate sponsors and to suppress rather than to
debate important political and ideological differences
between the organising political parties. In this way
the event lost its bottom up character and alienated
itself from the civic and cultural groups it was meant
to connect to (Fernandez and Andreu 2004). This also
had a negative effect on the public perception of the
urban transformation project. In contrast to the
Olympic era, the physical ‘legacy’ of the spatial
investments hardly generated any enthusiasm. The
Forum area consists of large and empty open spaces,
iconic buildings, luxury high-rise hotels and a lack of
urban functions. After the cultural event it has
transformed into the antithesis of a thriving urban
space. By contrast, the large conference centre is an
economic success. On the other hand there is the
Diagonal Mar area with its indoor shopping mall,
semi-privatised public spaces and luxury condo-
miniums that is contradictory to Barcelona’s legacy
of fine-knit integrated urban neighbourhoods. Forum
has satisfied some strategic economic wishes of
Barcelona’s political elite. However, serious criticisms
have been voiced about the huge public spending on













Forum 594.20 784.90b 232.20c 138.60d 1,749.90
Diagonal Mar 489.00 – – – 489.00
% 48.4 35.1 10.4 6.2 2,238.90
a The data in this table is taken from two sources which reveal several inconsistencies in the official figures. We took Tersol 2004,
pp. 59–60, as our main source and used a newer source of the Ajuntament de Barcelona 2006, pp. 155–159, for a further refinement,
especially of the origin of the different categories of public spending
b Of the total investment of the municipality, 32.9% came from European funding for local projects
c Of these, €56 million came from European funds
d In fact, all Spanish state investments were from European funds at their disposal
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this project which critics say did not help to solve
problems relating to long-term unemployment, gro-
wing social inequalities in the city and rising housing
prices (Garcı´a and Claver 2003; Balibrea 2004). The
closed governance setting in which the project was
shaped and executed has prevented it from being
better balanced with, or integrated into, a more
citizen-oriented agenda.
A cross-border government-oriented approach
in Copenhagen
During the past two decades, the Danish capital of
Copenhagen has developed into a prominent example
of a city-region where local spatial and economic
development have become strongly connected with
inter regional and international networks (Thor Ander-
sen et al. 2002). During the Nineties, the increased
cooperation between the Copenhagen region (Zealand)
and the South Swedish region around Malmo¨ (Skaane)
as an integrated Oresund-region, gave planning and
economic development an important regional trans-
scalar dimension (OECD 2003). However, although
often praised as a model of cross-border interregional
cooperation, the new direction urban governance has
taken in Copenhagen has also been criticised. On the
one hand, the overall Oresund integration strategies
have been described as being still rather ‘imaginary’ or
‘illusory’ (OECD 2003; Hospers 2006). Ørestad,
Copenhagen’s most iconic development project in
the light of this cross-border strategy, has been
criticised as lacking democratic control and transpa-
rent economic management (Andersen 2003).
At the beginning of the Nineties, a quite abrupt
change in policy direction in Denmark—which had
been largely dominated until then by a Keynesian
distributive logic—led to the embracing of a metro-
politan growth strategy for the Copenhagen region and
a strong entrepreneurial turn in urban planning policies
(Thor Andersen and Jørgensen 1995; Lund Hansen
et al. 2001). The background to this sudden switch is
based on a combination of factors. The first was the dire
financial situation of the Copenhagen municipality that
was accumulating increasing debts while coping with
rising social needs in a period of a continuous lack of
economic and infrastructure investments. A second
important aspect was the growing understanding
among politicians about the importance of metro-
politan competitiveness in a quickly integrating
Europe. The fact that Sweden had recently joined the
EU triggered local politicians to revive the old concept
of Oresund cooperation with the Malmo¨ area as an
important form of local responsiveness designed to
create a more competitive environment. This process
of closer cross border cooperation was strongly
encouraged when, after influential lobbying by the
European Round Table of Industrialists, the Swedish
and Danish national governments decided to construct
a combined car and rail bridge between the two cities in
1991. This bridge opened in 2000.
The Oresund integration process has been shaped
by political, economic and social objectives. The
Oresund Committee is a political cross-border part-
nership between regional and local authorities from
both the Danish and Swedish sides. It is this
committee that actively promoted programmes to
increase cooperation between companies in the same
sector on both sides, to improve cooperation between
research institutions and universities, to stimulate
cross-border trade, travel and work and to create a
common ‘branding’ to increase awareness for local
citizens of the Oresund integration policies and
attract foreign investment (Hospers 2006). The pro-
cess was further stimulated by funding from the
European Union’s Interreg IIA and IIIA programmes,
which selected it as a ‘model for European cross-
border cooperation’, due to the unique bi-national
character of the cooperation and the special emphasis
on policies in order to integrate the two labour
markets more effectively.1
Although the Oresund region has undergone strong
economic development in the last decade and scores
high as regards ‘competitiveness’ and ‘quality of life’
indicators, the results of the integration policies have
been mixed till now, both economically and socially.
On the positive side, the improved cooperation
between different higher-education and research
institutions on both sides of the Sound has been
promising (OECD 2003). The creation of a cross-
1 Between 1996 and 2001, the Greater Copenhagen area and
Skaane received total funding of € 29 million (€ 13.5 million
provided by the European Commission, € 13.5 million from
public funds from the region itself and € 2 million from private
sources). In the next program (INTERREG III A) for 2000–
2006, an expanded geographical area consisting of the whole
Øresund region was allocated a budget of € 61.8 million
(co-financed equally by the EU commission and the Danish and
Swedish governments) (OECD 2003, pp. 87–90).
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border labour market has, however, been hampered
by differences in taxation and welfare policies
between the two countries and the high costs of
using the bridge (Bucken-Knapp 2001; Wichmann
Matthiessen 2004). The overall project is also criti-
cised as a form of ‘governance without government’,
since there is no directly elected body governing the
Oresund region (OECD 2003).
The most important urban planning icon of the
Oresund integration was—besides the Oresund
bridge—the Ørestad project. Located just south of
Copenhagen, next to the infrastructure bundle that
leads to the bridge to Malmo¨ and Copenhagen’s
international airport, Ørestad is a large (3.1 million
square metres) mixed-use development area for high-
end offices, housing and facilities. It aims to provide
the Copenhagen area with a new ‘competitive’
location for the tertiary sector and provide the city
with a new ultra-modern public transport system, the
driverless mini metro. By developing a large piece of
land co-owned by the municipality and the national
government over a 30 year period, its initiators
expected that enough profit would be made to pay
off large government secured loans which financed
the construction of most of the mini metro before any
urban development would have taken place. This
whole operation is managed by a semi-public Ørestad
Development Corporation (merged in 2007 into the
Port & City Development Corporation) responsible
for both the construction and operation of the metro
and the sale of the parcels in the Ørestad area.
Two important aspects of Ørestad were particularly
innovative. On the one hand it was a prime example of a
local response to counteract, by means of a grandiose
public investment, the declining economic situation of
the Copenhagen area. The initiators expected Ørestad
to help re-position Copenhagen within an expected
fierce competition with other European cities and
regions as the major Scandinavian city by giving the
city a new prime location for modern offices. The
central location with direct rail and road links to
Copenhagen, the international airport and the Swedish
side of the Oresund anticipated on the economic
benefits of the cross-border integration. The metro
would be a major solution for the city’s gridlock traffic
problems. This pro-active strategy differed conside-
rably from the welfare-oriented distributive spatial
policies that dominated in the city in the previous
decades that hardly paid any attention to large physical
(infrastructure) investments in the capital (Majoor and
Jørgensen 2007). The second innovative aspect was the
governance form: a public led, but very introverted,
development corporation (with a 55% stake by the
municipality and 45% by the national government) that
would execute the scheme in a corporatist way. The
special Ørestad Act allowed existing democratic
planning procedures to be largely overruled. This
was a conscious ‘solution’ provided by the national
government and municipality based on the expectation
that a more participatory strategy would strongly
diminish the chances of swift decision-making and
execution of the plan (Majoor 2008). Due to this closed
governance setting and the fact that part of the project
was planned in an environmentally sensitive area, the
project has faced strong opposition from active citizens
groups ever since its quite sudden initiation in 1992
(Jørgensen et al. 1997).
The question is what the major results were of this
quite forceful form of local responsiveness? For a
variety of reasons, the first decade of development in
Ørestad has not generated the expected dynamism in
the area. The project has till now been mainly a
showcase of public spending of infrastructure. The
real estate investments have predominately been in
housing and facilities, while development of offi-
ces—which was originally intended to be the major
land use—has been very slow (see Table 3). The
positive redistributive aspect of the project is the
quite successful mini metro. However, due to major
cost increases during its construction and a failure to
attract the over-optimistic initial passenger predic-
tions, the mini metro project is facing serious
financial problems. An additional problem for the
Ørestad Development Corporation has been the lack
of demand from (international) private sector inves-
tors in the project. A lack of regional coordination of
Table 3 Quantitative overview of the first building stages of








a Of which 178,000 m2 is for the Field’s shopping mall
Source: Ørestadsselskabet (2008)
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office development in Copenhagen, after the abolish-
ment of most regional planning at the end of the
Nineties, clearly hampered Ørestad in this respect
(Thor Andersen et al. 2002). In order to achieve its
financial objectives, the Ørestad Development Cor-
poration had to speed up the housing part of the
project and was cross-subsidised by different forced
relocations from government institutions into the area
(Andersen 2003; Majoor 2008).
We can conclude that the Oresund formula, with
its focus on cross-border integration, is a quite
successful example of a form of trans-scalar local
responsiveness which helped two regions to position
themselves more effectively in international net-
works. Its material benefits are, however, still hard
to define and probably need more time to materialise,
just like the political and social dimensions of the
cross-border cooperation. The Ørestad project, as a
sort of ideological offspring of this cooperation, is
easier to assess. On the one hand it is a rather classic
example of local responsiveness, by creating invest-
ment opportunities for international businesses. Its
trans-scalar dimensions lie in the intense political and
financial partnership between the local government
and the national government that was set up, and, to a
lesser extent, its location and clear ideological focus
on the Oresund cross-border region. Although its
redistributive aspects—the profits of land develop-
ment are used to pay for a public transport system—
are quite innovative, the direct economic benefits of
the project are still unclear. More alarmingly, the
strategic reorientation of urban planning policies in
Copenhagen on economic cross-border opportunities
and inner governmental cooperation, has not been
matched with adequate social programmes to coun-
terbalance the increasing social inequalities in the
city. Civic groups and academics criticise the huge
public investments in Ørestad for their single-minded
economic bias, neglecting broader social needs in the
city (Andersen and Hovga˚rd 2003).
Conclusion
Our investigation into forms of trans-scalar respon-
siveness related to urban planning in Barcelona and
Copenhagen indeed shows that cities can be much
more than ‘leaves in the wind’ in an enduring storm
of economic liberalization and competition. New
dynamism is possible through the creation of new
local arenas of action and the connecting of these
with wider social, political and economic networks. If
we compare the two cities there are interesting
similarities. Both the Copenhagen and Barcelona
municipalities have reoriented their urban policies
around a much more competitive focus in the last two
decades. The Ørestad and Forum projects are clear
markers of this shift. With a view to realising these
projects, new international political links were
explored in Copenhagen and new international cul-
tural links in Barcelona. However, the main goal of
both projects was especially to utilise these links to
pressure regional and national governments to invest
in these local projects. In both cases, this aspect of the
trans-scalar reorientation worked most convincingly.
Due to the international component of their strategies,
both Barcelona and Copenhagen were treated as
significant national priorities and received govern-
ment investments to ensure that their objectives could
be quickly realised. Although these projects hint at an
increased capacity for local action, they have also
resulted in projects—and forms of governance—that
focus on rather one-sided economic goals and have
therefore disappointed many local observers. In a
situation of real or imagined competition between
cities, both Forum and Ørestad are prominent exam-
ples of urban planning projects that focus primarily
on pleasing ‘the outsider, the investor, developer,
businesswoman or -man, the elite culture freak, or the
money packed tourist’ (Moulaert et al. 2003, p. 2).
They are accompanied by flexible forms of gover-
nance that circumvent traditional forms of policy
deliberation. In the Copenhagen case, Ørestad
fiercely broke a tradition of participatory citizens’
oriented governance, while residents of Barcelona
eventually felt extremely alienated by Forum’s
programme and its rush to complete the project
before the 2004 cultural event.
One of the founders of the urban regime analysis in
the Eighties, Clarence Stone, recently observed that it
is important to keep in mind that urban regime analysis
is about more than analyzing and explaining how and
why economic development so often occupies a prio-
rity position in agenda setting. It is also about what it
would take to build and maintain a different agenda of
urban priorities (Stone 2005, p. 328). In our opinion,
the biggest challenge in connection with this agenda is
twofold. Although the two cases showed that local
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governments can enlarge their action perspective by
connecting local projects with national and interna-
tional economic, political and cultural sectors, the
resulting policies and projects are still quite unba-
lanced, reflecting the quite introverted coalitions on
which they are based. Although it makes sense to set up
new governance bodies, like development corpora-
tions, to coordinate these trans-scalar initiatives
effectively, it is necessary for these bodies to be
connected more effectively to public scrutiny and the
influence of elected officials and their bodies of
‘traditional’ government. Although this might sound
counterproductive in the eyes of the initiators of large-
scale projects who favour ‘smooth’ decision-making
and execution, the two cases clearly show the long-
term weaknesses of these corporatists approaches.
Neither Forum nor Ørestad has developed into the
thriving mixed-use cultural or business location they
were expected to become, mainly because they
respectively lacked connectivity to civic and private
domains. Secondly, local social movements should
also innovate and try to adopt trans-scalar strategies of
policymaking to counter—and possibly comple-
ment—the economic hegemony such projects
represent. The cases provide evidence of the enlarge-
ment of local power via active trans-scalar policies. For
civic groups, however, this strategy still appears to be a
bridge too far in both cases.
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